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Abstract
Borderline personality disorder and narcissistic personality disorder are important noso-
graphic entities and have been subject of intensive investigations. The currently prevailing
psychodynamic theory for mental disorders is based on the repertoire of defense mechanisms
employed. Another line of research is concerned with the study of psychological traumas and
dissociation as a defensive response. Both theories can be used to shed light on some aspects
of pathological mental functioning, and have many points of contact. This work merges these
two psychological theories, and builds a model of mental function in a relational context called
Quadripolar Relational Model. The model, which is enriched with ideas borrowed from the
field of computer science, leads to a new therapeutic proposal for psychological traumas and
personality disorders.
1 Introduction
This work presents a model of emotional interaction, called Quadripolar Relational Model.
Most models of emotions emerged in the last decade (Marsella et al., 2010) belong to one of
the following categories: anatomic models, dimensional models, appraisal models. Anatomical
models (LeDoux, 2000) try to reconstruct the neural pathways that underlie emotional reactions;
one of the best known results is the elucidation of the role of amygdala in fear processing. In
dimensional models (Rubin and Talarico, 2009) emotions are characterized by a number of axes
or dimensions, and the emotional state of an individual is represented as a point of a hypercube.
In appraisal models, emotions are argued to arise from patterns of individual judgment con-
cerning the relationship between events and personal beliefs, desires and intentions (Lazarus,
1991; Sander et al., 2005). For example, if external reality is congruent with the person’s life
goals, he/she may feel happy. Appraisals may also trigger cognitive responses, often referred to
as coping strategies (e.g., planning, procrastination or resignation) feeding back into a continual
cycle of appraisal and re-appraisal.
As we shall see, our model foresees the existence of four relational states, each associated to
specific emotions. The concept of relational states is present in transactional analysis (Berne,
1964), a psychological theory which considers the self as consisting of three structures or states,
each with specific functions: the parent, the adult and the child. The communication between
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1 INTRODUCTION
two individuals can be read as a “transaction” (or exchange) between different states or counter-
parts of two selves.
Another relevant model is Structural Analysis of Social Behavior (SASB) (Benjamin, 1996),
which offers a framework to describe human relationships as points in a three-dimensional
space. The three axes are: “love-hate”, “enmeshment-differentiation“ and “interpersonal focus”.
Points between poles represent behavioral patterns (such as “blame”, “attack” and “protect”) con-
sisting of components from the nearest poles. The central idea of SASB-based therapy, which was
applied to personality disorders, is that patterns of disorder are replications of patterns learned
from caregivers.
Our model merges psychodynamic elements with elements borrowed from the theory of psy-
chological traumas and builds a framework for the description of borderline personality disorder
and narcissistic personality disorder. A thorough characterization of these complex conditions,
which would require a detailed description of symptoms and a consideration of various sub-types,
is outside the scope of this work: our objective is to put in evidence some key features, that we
will then try to model. We are aware of the complexity of psychological disorders: our model,
based on a simplification of reality, has the purpose to interpret some limited aspects of mental
functioning.
Borderline personality disorder (BPD) (Gunderson and Hoffman, 2005) is characterized
by a pervasive instability of mood, of personal relationships, of the perception of the self, identity
and behavior. The central defense mechanism used by persons with BPD is splitting, which can
be defined as the inability to integrate positive and negative aspects of the self and others. The
result is a characteristic view of the world in “black and white” (Perry et al., 2013). Another
typical defense mechanism employed in BPD is projective identification, by which split-off parts
of the self are projected into the object to exert possess and control (Klein, 1946). As a result of
using such defenses, persons with BPD often engage in idealization and devaluation of others,
alternating between high positive regard and heavy disappointment.
The main characteristics of narcissistic personality disorder (NPD) (Lowen, 2004) are
an excessive reference to others for self-esteem regulation, a deficit in the ability to feel empathy
towards other individuals, a particular self-perception of the subject defined “grandiose Self”,
and a difficulty of emotional involvement. The exaggerated dependence on others for approval
causes self-appraisal to oscillate between extremes. The person is characterized by a form of
deep selfishness of which he/she is usually not aware. The consequences are likely to produce
suffering, social problems or significant emotional and relational difficulties. NPD shares with
BPD the use of splitting and projective identification as core defense mechanisms.
The currently prevailing psychodynamic vision (Ahles, 2004) characterizes mental diseases
(including BPD and NPD) based on the repertoire of associated defense mechanisms. Such de-
fenses would be erected to overcome intrapsychic conflicts and/or wounds originating in the in-
teraction between the future patient and the caregiver. According to O. Kernberg BPD and NPD
share a so-called “borderline personality organization” (Kernberg, 1967), conceptualized in terms
of unintegrated and undifferentiated affects and representations of the self and others.
The “psychotraumatologic vision”, instead, is concerned with the investigation of psycholog-
ical traumas of different kinds and the associated mental structures. The most common re-
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sponse to trauma is represented by dissociation, defined as the distortion, limitation or loss of
the normal associative links between perceptions, emotions, thoughts and behavior. The out-
come of traumatic experiences is a characteristic syndrome called “post-traumatic stress disor-
der” (PTSD) (Andreasen, 2010), which can be “complex” when the traumas are repeated, often
within a familiar context (Herman, 1992).
In both BPD and NPD the unstable sense of self can lead to episodes of dissociation and
chronic feelings of emptiness. Dissociation can take the form of depersonalization (feeling of sep-
aration from oneself and one’s body), derealization (feeling of being detached from the external
world), selective amnesia and emotional detachment (Radovic and Radovic, 2002).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is introduced in section 2 and used
in section 3 to obtain an interpretation of some aspects of BPD and NPD. Section 4 puts forward
a therapeutic proposal based on the model. Section 5 draws the conclusions and outlines future
research directions.
2 The quadripolar relational model
Value of features
External reality can be conceptualized in terms of features. Examples of simple perceptual
features are: shape, orientation, color. Examples of more abstract features are: “black horses”,
“boys playing tennis”, “to be a teacher”. Features are not independent of each other: complex
features (e.g. faces) are based on simpler ones (e.g. oriented edges). Features can be conceived
as nodes of a (very large) neural network in the brain.
Features can be active or inactive and different situations correspond to different sets of
active features. For instance, if a person is walking in the jungle, the features encoding the
concepts of “dark” and “tree” may be active, while other features, such as “office chair” and
“computer screen”, are likely to be inactive. Feature activation and deactivation is a continuous
process, driven by perceptual features fed from external stimuli, and propagated to more abstract
ones in real time. This occurs on a fast time scale, as the mind “navigates” through everyday life.
We postulate that features are characterized by a property called value, that can be either
positive or negative. Features such as “beauty” or “health”, for example, may be considered
positive, while features such as “deception” or “illness” are generally considered negative. The
determination and change of feature value happens by association: if a new feature of unknown
value is presented in association with positive features, it will assume a positive connotation.
Since a feature in general takes part in many associations, its value will be determined by the
combined effect of all associations. Feature value is a long term property, expected to change on
a slower time scale.
Relational module
Human beings are social animals and relations play a central role in human behavior. Emotions
arise often as a reaction to the actions of another human being within a relational context.
Humans give also much importance to the role of hierarchy. In many life situations, it is crucial
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Figure 1: Neural module that manages relational judgements. The module classifies the sensory input into four
poles. Each pole corresponds to a different combination of states for the self and for the object, and is associated to
specific emotions.
to decide who is right and who is wrong, who is superior and who is inferior. This can be helpful
when an employee must decide which tone he/she should use while addressing one of his/her
peers or a senior board member. In some circumstances this insight can be a matter of life and
death.
Our assumption is that a specific neural module is dedicated to managing relational judge-
ments (Fig. 1). This module makes use of the stimuli coming from the perceptual apparatus, as
well as of information obtained from memory, and attributes a value to two key symbols: the
self and the object. In this context, “positive” can be interpreted as either “important” or “right”,
while “negative” can be interpreted as either “unimportant” or “wrong”. As a result, there are
four possible relational poles, each associated to specific emotions:
• A : positive self and positive object
(the self feels love and affection towards a rewarding object)
• B : negative self and positive object
(the self feels pain and shame in front of a superior /humiliating object)
• C : negative self and negative object
(the self feels sadness or fear when self and object are both negative or helpless)
• D : positive self and negative object
(the self feels anger for a guilty object or despises an inferior object)
The relational module has the objective to process the perceptual input, produce an interpre-
tation of reality and select one of these relational poles. In this sense, our model may be con-
sidered as belonging to the category of appraisal models of emotions. The association of shame,
guilt and sadness to a lower social status is confirmed by numerous studies (Stevens and Price,
1996). Also the association of anger to a higher social status has been recognized and studied
(Tiedens, 2011).
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Figure 2: Normal condition. In the non-pathological case traumatic contexts are very few and limited in scope (left
panel). The mind can switch smoothly between relational poles in each context, thanks to an intact relational module
(middle panel). No pole requires dissociation: the repertoire of emotions is fully accessible (right panel).
Normal functioning
From a relational perspective, the objective of mental activity is to create a map of all possible
situations that can be encountered in the course of life, and build for each situation a model
that tells how to behave. Relational situations can be grouped in different “contexts”, such as
“relation with mother”, “peer relation”,“relation with schoolmates” (Fig. 2-left). Each context
contains situations that are similar and require a specific approach: when the same or a similar
situation is encountered again, the relevant model is retrieved from memory and used to direct
behavior.
A context can be represented on a plane, in which points correspond to individual situations
(Fig. 2-center), characterized by different combinations of active features. Each point belongs
to the “zone of influence” of one of the four relational poles. Each pole originates from a point
representing the most prototypical situation associated to the pole, and extends towards less pro-
totypical situations. Pole D, for instance, may originate from a situation-point characterized by
an object behaving very dishonestly, eliciting a very strong anger. Points further away from the
center of the pole may be characterized by a better behavior of the object. In normal conditions,
the mind can switch smoothly between poles, during its navigation through everyday life.
Traumatic events
The relational poles that can be involved in a trauma are those indicated with B and C in Fig. 1,
in which the self is negative: we refer to them as to the negative poles, for brevity. In case they
are affected by a trauma, they will be called traumatic poles. Pole B consists of a negative self
and a positive object. This may correspond to a situation in which a child is abused physically or
verbally by the caregiver. Pole C corresponds to a self and an object which are both negative and
subject to intense fear and/or sadness and/or helplessness. This might occur when the caregiver
is unable to calm the child, and actually contributes to increase his/her fear showing a frightened
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expression. This is the so-called frightened-frightening caregiver which is associated to forms of
disorganized attachment (Main and Solomon, 1986).
In case of trauma, the emotional values elicited are too high and the functioning of the re-
lational module becomes critical, not unlike what happens to a camera when the light is too
intense and the picture becomes blurred. We assume that the level of emotion E is proportional
to the difference between the perceived value of the object Vobj and the perceived value of the
self Vself in case B, and to the difference between a reference value Vref and the perceived value
of the self in case C. The value of the self and of the object are in turn determined by the sum
of the values of all active features associated to them, Vsi and Voi. In formulas (S is the sigmoid
function, which prevents the emotional values from exceeding a maximum threshold):
Pole B: E = S(Vobj – Vself)
Pole C: E = S(Vref – Vself)
Vself = S(
∑
i Vsi); Vobj = S(
∑
i Voi)
An example can clarify how the occurrence of a trauma is modeled. Let us suppose that the
victim of the trauma is a violin player and the perpetrator is the orchestra conductor. Before
the trauma, in the victim’s mind there are features associated to the self: “not being an artist”
(negative), “imprecision” (negative), “to make mistakes while playing the violin” (negative). In
the victim’s mind, there are also features associated to the object: “to be a great artist” (positive),
“perfection” (positive), “to make no mistakes” (positive). If, during a concert, the victim makes
a mistake and is criticized by the conductor, the value of the self-related features are further
reduced and drag down the value of the self, while the value of the object remains very high. The
level of pain and shame become extremely high and the trauma takes place.
This scenario is very likely to occur within a family, where the values of all features are set
by the parents. In other words, the parents decide the rules of the game and the child has no
choice but to accept to play a game governed by rules on which he/she has no say. This gives an
unfair advantage to the parents, who are likely to be better than the child at their own game.
This of course does not need to lead to a trauma, if the parents do not critisize or humiliate the
child for not “playing well”.
Response to trauma: dissociation
Upon the occurrence of a trauma, the associative function of the mind stops working: this cor-
responds to the phenomenon of dissociation. We distinguish between two different concepts of
dissociation. The first concept, which we call “online dissociation”, refers to the selective ex-
clusion from consciousness of one or more perceptual channels. This is a temporary condition,
caused by the fact that some emotional values are too high. The second concept is that of “mem-
ory dissociation”, or “dissociated memory”. This concept refers to a condition of the memory, in
which there are incomplete records, that for this reason exhibit a lower degree of connectivity
with the rest of memory and are more difficult to retrieve. A dissociated memory is the outcome
of episodes of online dissociation.
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Figure 3: Map of relational poles in the feature space in case of trauma. In a traumatic context (left), pole B and/or
pole C are characterized by too high emotional levels, and are inhibited. When the mind happens to be in one of these
poles (forbidden zone), emotional dissociation kicks in. To avoid dissociation, the mind oscillates between poles A and
D. The mind can stay in pole A or pole D as long as the situation is prototypical for the pole. When the situation
drifts out of the prototypical zone into the transition zone (shown in grey), splitting symptoms appear, and the mind
switches to the prototypical zone of the other permitted pole. For a hyper-traumatic context (right), the forbidden and
transition zones are much more extended and the free zone around pole A vanishes.
When can hypothesize that, upon the first occurrence of a trauma, dissociation is deep and
involve both the rational and the emotional part. This may correspond to the “freezing” behavior
of children while interacting with their mothers, in case of “disorganized attachment” (Main and
Solomon, 1986). This kind of dissociation provides an effective shield to emotional pain. On the
other hand, a condition in which mental function is temporarily turned off exposes the individual
to serious consequences in a potentially dangerous environment. The use of deep dissociation as
a defense mechanism is impractical, potentially fatal, and cannot be sustained for long periods
of time.
Emotional dissociation is a more limited form of dissociation which, in a traumatic situation,
excludes from consciousness the emotional component, while the rational part continues to be
active. The subjective experience that accompanies this kind of dissociation may be represented
by the phenomena of derealization and depersonalization, characterized by a diminished sense
of reality. It is not unrealistic to assume that, in case of repeated traumas, the mind learns to
replace total dissociation with emotional dissociation, as a compromise able to allow a higher
level of functioning.
Response to trauma: splitting
In case of trauma, the adoption of emotional dissociation makes it possible for the mind the stay
in the negative relational poles B and C, excluding intolerable emotions from consciousness. It is
compatible with a mental functioning which would appear normal to most observers. However,
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it implies the absence of the emotional component of mental life, which represents a heavy price
to be paid. Therefore, the mind tries to avoid the negative poles B and C, and heads towards the
positive poles A and D, where it can exist with all its functions active: this corresponds to the
defence mechanism of splitting.
In the presence of traumas, the context space can be divided into three zones (Fig. 3-left):
“forbidden zone”, “transition zone” and “free zone”. The forbidden zone is the zone around a
traumatic pole, which cannot be accessed in a non-dissociated state (hence the term “forbidden”);
the transition zone is a safety belt around the forbidden zone, and the free zone is an area far
from all traumatic poles, corresponding to the zone around the positive poles A and D.
The mind stays in the zone around pole A as long as conditions are prototypical for pole A, i.e.
as long as the relation with the object is perfect, full of trust and mutual respect. As conditions
depart from their prototypical values for pole A, the mind switches abruptly to the zone around
pole D. When conditions are not perceived as prototypical for pole D, the mind jumps back to pole
A, and the cycle repeats itself. This model explains the idealization-devaluation cycle based on
splitting. Fig. 3-right shows a context in which the impact of trauma is deeper and, as a result,
the forbidden and transition zones are larger: we call such context “hyper-traumatic”.
The transition zone is a safety belt built around the forbidden zone. In the transition zone
the features involved in the trauma (the defects criticized) appear distorted and magnified. The
distortion of defects serves the purpose to alert that the current situation is not prototypically
positive anymore and it is creeping towards a traumatic pole. With reference to the example of
the violin player, the slightest mistake done when playing in public may sound magnified and
“threatening” in the player’s mind. If the feature criticized is “to have a big nose”, when looking
at the mirror the person will see his/her nose magnified, like in a caricature. Sometimes, despite
all efforts, the mind cannot avoid to fall back into a traumatic pole. When this happens, it resorts
to emotional dissociation to protect itself from pain.
3 Interpretation of personality disorders
Interpretation of BPD
BDP is a complex condition, in which genetic and environmental factors are hypothesized to play
a role. Childhood traumas involving caregivers are often present in the history of persons with
BPD (MacIntosh et al., 2015; Elices et al., 2015). As a result, the functioning of the relational
module may be impaired in key contexts such as “mother relation” and “sexual relation” (Fig. 4).
In such contexts poles B and C are difficult to access, and the mind is forced to oscillate between
poles A and D. When the mind falls into poles B or C, emotional dissociation is used to avoid
re-living the painful emotions associated to the trauma.
Despite the evident drawbacks of this behavior, the BPD person manages to keep his/her
emotions while oscillating between the two sides of splitting, and only occasionally resorts to
emotional dissociation, as a last defense line. The maintenance of the emotional part allows
the BPD person to spend most of the time on a relatively high level of functioning. The BPD
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Figure 4: BPD: context map and emotional functioning. Some key contexts, such as “mother relation” and “sexual
relation”, are traumatic. In these contexts the functioning of the relational module is impaired: poles B and C are
difficult to access in a non-dissociated condition, and the mind oscillates between poles A and D.
person is not happy when he/she experiences emotional detachment, he/she understands that
something is wrong.
In the transition zone, the distortion and amplification of the features involved in traumatic
situations has the purpose to warn the mind that it is nearing a traumatic pole. This is rem-
iniscent of the phenomenon of “aberrant salience” which, according to some theories (Kapur,
2003), is deemed responsible for the positive symptoms of schizophrenia (hallucinations and
delusions). The salience mechanism would be mediated by the neurotransmitter dopamine: this
would explain why antipsychotic drugs, that act by blocking the dopamine receptor, are effective
in eliminating hallucinations. In contrast to the “pure” dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia
(Baumeister and Francis, 2002), these theories explain why antipsychotic drugs have effect only
after a period of time after the start of their administration.
An intriguing possibility suggested by our model is that the phenomenon of aberrant salience
in schizophrenia and the mechanism of feature distortion in the transition zone of a traumatic
context could both be expressions of a standard warning mechanism used by the mind to stay
away from traumatic poles. Transitory perceptual distortions or “pseudo-hallucinations” are
present also in personality disorders (Gras et al., 2014). The difference between such distortions
and schizophrenic hallucinations would be quantitative rather than qualitative. The higher
degree of severity of the hallucinatory symptoms in schizophrenia could be determined by a
heavier traumatic charge and possibly mediated by a genetic predisposition. Another clinical
example that could be explained by the phenomenon of feature distortion is the dysmorphic
body image associated to eating disorders (among many other disorders) (Ruffolo et al., 2006).
Interpretation of NPD
As in the case of BDP, it is not unreasonable to think that, besides genetic predisposing factors,
childhood traumas may play a role in the development of NPD (Lowen, 2004). As a result, the
9
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Figure 5: NPD: context map and emotional functioning. Some key contexts, such as “mother relation” and “sexual
relation”, are traumatic. In these contexts the functioning of the relational module is impaired: poles B and C cannot
be accessed without dissociation, and the mind is forced to oscillate between poles A and D. Unlike the BPD case, pole
A is devoid of emotional content, and filled with grandiose fantasies.
functioning of the relational module may be impaired in key contexts such as “mother relation”
and “sexual relation” (Fig. 5). In such contexts poles B and C cannot be accessed without disso-
ciation and the mind is forced to oscillate between poles A and D. When the mind falls into poles
B or C, emotional dissociation is used to avoid feeling the painful traumatic emotions.
Our assumption is that, in the NPD case, the traumas affecting a traumatic context are more
severe. As a result, the forbidden and transition zones are more extended, so that the free zone
around pole A is almost non-existent, while the free zone around pole D may still be present.
Splitting is employed also by the NPD person, but with a different connotation. Pole D, in which
a positive self unleashes its anger towards a frustrating and guilty object, is present also in NPD:
the difference lies in pole A. While in the BPD case pole A is characterized by love and affection,
in the NPD case love and affection do not belong to the repertoire of memories of the person, and
therefore cannot be used to build a behavioral scheme for pole A. Instead of a scheme based on
real life examples, the NPD person resorts to a fantasy: the bright side of his/her splitted reality
is played by the grandiose self.
The grandiose image is not associated to strong positive emotions: rather, it is imbued with
a sense of victory and revenge for the past frustrations. Since pole A of NPD is not grounded on
concrete experiences, is not associated to strong feelings and overall lays on very shaky grounds
(such as the reward coming from the external world), it is much more volatile and unstable
compared to pole A of BPD. When the world does not show enough empathy and/or provide
sufficient reward, the NPD person jumps into pole D or is forced back into emotional dissociation.
This is the state in which the NPD person spends most of his/her time.
This condition, characterized by emotional numbness, is not so disturbing for the NPD person
as it is for the BPD person. This because the BPD person lives for most of the time in the world
of emotions, and immediately perceives when dissociation kicks-in. The NPD person, on the
contrary, is used to living without emotions: this is his/her normal condition. From the viewpoint
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Figure 6: Features of the self and of the abusing object. Most features associated to the self are negative, most
features associated to the object are positive (positive features are shown in yellow, negative features are shown in
grey).
of the emotional content, switching from the grandiose self to dissociation does not make much
of a difference.
A reduced capacity to feel (certain) emotions is considered a central feature of antisocial per-
sonality disorder (APD) and psychopathy (Stevens et al., 2001; Hastings et al., 2008). This trait
can be interpreted with our model if we assume that, in case of psychopaths, the negative poles B
and C are not associated to strong emotional responses and therefore cannot be traumatized. Or,
for this category of people, the capacity to dissociate would be so deep and pervasive as to elimi-
nate the need for a transition zone in the feature space. If this were true, APD and psychopathy
could be inserted into our framework as extreme cases of NPD.
4 Therapeutic proposal
So far, we have seen how our model requires that psychological traumas that disrupt the func-
tioning of the relational module in pole B are due to an emotional abuse by an object perceived
as worthier than the self. In other words, a value gap between the object and the self is a pre-
condition for the establishment and for the maintenance of a trauma.
A line of thought maintains that, to resolve a trauma, it is necessary to relive the traumatic
event and reexperience the negative emotions associated, while providing at the same time a
more favorable interpretation of the event. This can be done with the help of EMDR (Shapiro
and Laliotis, 2010), which facilitates the reprocessing of the traumatic material. However, if the
associated pain is too strong, the patient may not be willing to relive it and, once brought (by
the psychologist) to the traumatic point, he/she resort to emotional dissociation. In this way,
the trauma is not relived at the emotional level, and is not resolved. We argue that, to ensure
that the patient is able to access the traumatic experience emotionally, the level of pain must be
reduced preventively.
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As pointed out in section 2, the level of emotional pain is proportional to the difference be-
tween the perceived value of the object and the perceived value of the self. The value of the self
and of the object depend in turn on all the associated features. If the value of the self is low, it
is because most associated features are negative. If the value of the object is high, it is because
most associated features are positive (Fig. 6). It is impossible to have a negative self mostly
linked to positive features, or a positive object mostly linked to negative features.
In other words, the landscape of associated features constitutes the foundation of the trau-
matic structure: if the value of such features is changed, we can expect the value of the self and
of the object to change accordingly. As the value gap narrows, the level of emotional pain should
also diminish. At this point, the trauma would be susceptible of being attacked with techniques
such as EMDR, until its full resolution. Therefore, our therapeutic strategy is to address the
features associated to the self and to the object and change their value in the patient’s mind.
The good news is that the value attributed to most features is arbitrary. Some features, such
as intelligence, beauty, wealth, etc. are universally acknowledged as being positive. For such
features we may hypothesize the existence of some kind of genetic-evolutionary basis. But the
value of the vast majority of features appears to be completely arbitrary.
This can be appreciated by considering the diversity of convictions, beliefs and reference
values across cultures, geographical areas, ethnic groups and historical periods. Being slim
nowadays is a very positive feature. This was not the case in the past, when food was in scarse
supply and a higher level of fat was linked to a higher social status. Being tanned was once an
negative feature typical of members of the working class who had to work in the open, until Coco
Chanel convinced us that it was actually a good thing!
A high diversity of patterns of feature values can be seen in the same historical period and
within the same nation, across different social networks. For a given family, the feature “being
good at maths” can be considered positive and be appreciated, and the feature “play the piano”
can be considered negative and disregarded. In a different family, the opposite may be true. This
depends very much on the history and taste of the senior family members (usually the parents),
who set the core background value scenario. In principle, nothing prevents to bring changes to
this scenario.
This can be done by means of counterexamples. Given, for instance, the negative feature
“risky”, we can provide counterexamples in which taking risks proved to be a good idea. We
might mention Julius Caesar, who chose to cross the Rubicon; Jeff Bezos, who left a well-paid
Wall-Street job to create Amazon; Butch Cassidy and Sundance Kid, who jumped into a waterfall
(at least in the movie) and saved their lives. Given the negative feature “unpopular”, we might
say that Napoleon was very unpopular at the military academy and Einstein was unpopular
at school. Linking negative features to positive examples raises the features’ value. Similarly,
linking positive features to negative examples can be used to lower the features’ value.
The therapeutic strategy suggested has some points of contacts with Cognitive Behavioral
Therapy (CBT) (Longmore and Worrell, 2007). CBT is focused on changing distorted thoughts,
dysfunctional emotions and maladaptive behaviors of the patient, in order to reduce the symp-
toms of a psychological disorder. Unlike other psychotherapies which delve into the patient’s
past, CBT is mainly concerned with the present and oriented to the specific symptoms.
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There is a key difference between our suggested therapeutic framework and CBT. With CBT
patients are encouraged to change their distorted ways of thinking and irrational beliefs. If a
patient is convinced that “neighbors are spying on him”, the therapist may try to convince the
patient that this is not true. Our suggestion, instead, is to break the link between the idea and
the negative content. In other words: “even if neighbors are spying on you, why is that a bad
thing?”
Framed in these terms, our therapeutic proposal might look deceptively simple. The major
difficulty we can expect to encounter is due to the fact that the number of associated features
might be very large (hundreds). This can be clarified with an example. Let us suppose to have
100 black socks (corresponding to negative features), that we want to turn into white socks
(corresponding to positive features). Let us also suppose that, at regular intervals, a random
subset of socks is put into a washing machine (corresponding to the associative mechanism of
the mind). If the white socks in the washing machine are much fewer than the black socks (as
we can expect at the beginning of the treatment), they will take the color released from the black
socks and turn black again. Only when the white socks become the majority, is the “washing
machine effect” expected to help the therapy, but this may take a long time.
5 Conclusions
The objective of this work was to merge the psychodynamic theory based on defense mechanisms
and the theory of dissociation as a response to trauma, to produce a new interpretation of border-
line and narcissistic personality disorders. The outcome is a theoretical framework that allows
to highlight the features which are shared between the two disorders and the differences be-
tween them. Future work will be aimed to develop the model proposed and draw from it further
insights for therapy.
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